METHODOLOGY FOR THE DRC CASE STUDY FOR THE ALNAP GLOBAL STUDY ON CONSULTATION WITH AND PARTICIPATION BY BENEFICIARIES AND AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Groupe URD

June 14th, 2002

 

  1. CONTEXT
  2. With a population of almost 50 million, a land area of 2.3 million square kilometres, and large mineral resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a huge country with huge economic potential. It is, however, embroiled in Africa’s largest current war, that has drawn in the armies of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola. These countries are fighting for a variety of reasons – from the security of their border regions and the elimination of opposition groups hiding in the DRC, to sheer economic self-interest and the plunder of the DRC’s economic wealth. A UN report in May 2001 and a further report in May 2002 detail the extent of the exploitation of gold, diamonds, coltan, and forestry, amongst other resources, that has taken place. They also describe how the major concentrations of foreign troops are in areas with mineral wealth such as Kisangani and Mbuji Mayi.

    The Eastern part of DRC is controlled by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), based in Goma and backed by the Rwandan government. It is widely resented by the local people in North and, especially, South Kivu – represented by the Mai Mai fighters – and this is the cause of much of the insecurity in Kivu, rather than fighting with the government. The other main rebel faction in the East, supported by Uganda, is the Front pour la Libération du Congo (FLC) based in Gbadolite, Mobutu’s natal village, under the leadership of the wealthy businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba.

    In July 1999, the six nations fighting the war concluded a peace agreement in Lusaka, followed two years later by the deployment of UN peace-keeping troops (MONUC – the UN Observer Mission in DRC). This deployment, as well as subsequent peace talks in Sun City, South Africa, under the aegis of the Inter-Congolese dialogue, were facilitated by the replacement of assassinated president Laurent Kabila, by his son Joseph Kabila in January 2001. Progress at the talks, mediated by former Botswanian President Sir Ketumile Masire, was however stalled by a failure of the RCD to agree to the leadership structure proposed by Joseph Kabila. The FLC subsequently signed a unilateral peace agreement with the Kinshasa government, which gave the position of prime-minister to Jean-Pierre Bemba.

     

    Volcano Emergency:

    The first point to be stressed is that this emergency took place in the context of an already ongoing complex emergency brought about by 3 years of war, which followed almost 30 years of misrule under Mobutu. Mount Nyiragongo erupted on January 17th, 2002. Approximately 250,000 people temporarily fled into Rwanda, but started returning the next day despite the concerns of the international community, such is the dislike of the Congolese for Rwanda. The first food distributions took place in Goma on January 23rd, after bulldozers had cleared a path across the lava in order to allow 22.5MT to arrive (enough for 70,000 people for 1 week, according to WFP). There were problems in selecting beneficiaries and with disruption caused by groups that felt that they had been unfairly left off the lists.

    Some NGO’s, including MSF, believe that only a small amount of food aid was necessary during this period, and that giving too much would damage markets. According to a food-economy report by SCF, food prices in Goma rose only for a brief period until the roads were repaired – and prices in general in February were practically identical to those in January before the eruption (aside from maize and beans which fell due to the distribution of these items by aid agencies (Levine & Chastre 2002).

    Many people stated that the efficiency of the reaction to the emergency was directly related to whether the agency had been in Goma before the volcano erupted. Good baseline data about politics and about the region serve as one of the most important factors in determining how quickly agencies are able to understand how to react in an emergency. It goes without saying that if agency staff have seen how people react in one emergency (and there have been enough of them in Goma in the last 10 years and many organisations had been through them all), they will have a good idea about what they will react in another.

     

  3. OBJECTIVES

Some NGO’s claim that their projects are not really participatory, but that, nevertheless, they work. Many claim that participation is not possible in an emergency. Clearly ‘community participation’ is something that many agencies want to do, but are somehow unable to achieve. It is hoped that this study will be able to show what they have been able to achieve. This study also aims to show what improvements can be made by looking at the institutional barriers to participatory practices within organisations, as well as the local cultures and how they interact with aid agencies. This requires a clear theoretical perspective on what agencies mean by participation – its pitfalls and its potential. The objectives of this case study are to appraise the level participation and the approaches used for that purpose in DRC, with three objectives :

 

    3.    METHODS

    3.1. Overall approach

    The mission will use the following tools :

    Sectoral issues and participation

    Sectors

     

     

    Transversal Issues

    Health

    Economic security

    Human settlements

    Protection

    Education

    Transversal issues

    Co-ordination

    Health

    Water and sanitation

    Food aid

    Agricultural and economic rehabilitation

    Housing

    H. S. management

    IHL

    Human rights

    Primary

    Others

    Gender

    Environ-

    ment

     

    Participation by, consultation with and partnership

                             

     

    3.3. The team

    The team for the mission is composed of 3 persons :

    Charles Mugiraneza (canadian) : He is a long time researcher in this area and knows well its actors.

    Others : still being identifed

     

    3.4. Implementation timeframe

    Pre-mission preparation :

     

    During the Field missions :

     

    Post-mission activities :

    A tentative schedule for the mission is presented bellow:

     

    06/02

    07/02

    08/02

    09/02

    10/02

    11/02

    12/02

    01/03

    02/03

    03/03

    Exploratory mission (in April)

                       

    Preparation

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    Inter-team workshop

     

    -

                   

    Mission

     

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    Mission from project director

         

    -

               

    Feed-back Eastern DRC

         

    -

               

    1st Draft of the Monograph

         

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    -

           

    Presentation at ALNAP Biannual

             

    -

           

    Inter-team for the Handbook

                 

    -

       

    Preparation of the Handbook

                 

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